Investigación
Evidencia que guía cada decisión de producto.
TetherEd nace de la investigación aplicada en economía de la educación. Diseñamos herramientas a partir de lo que la evidencia muestra que realmente mejora el acceso.
Llevando evidencia científica a los sistemas educativos
La investigación revisada por pares en la que se basan nuestros productos.
Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice
Felipe Arteaga, Adam Kapor, Christopher A. Neilson, Seth Zimmerman · The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2022
In Chile, families overestimated their admission chances by 32 points and stopped searching early. Live platform warnings led 22% of high-risk applicants to add schools, cutting their non-placement risk by 58%. In New Haven, responders cut their risk by 42%.
Ver más →Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms
Adam Kapor, Christopher A. Neilson, Seth Zimmerman · American Economic Review, 2020
A survey of 417 New Haven households found families misjudged their admission chances by 37 points on average, and 32% ranked a non-favorite school first. Letting families safely list true preferences raised average family welfare in New Haven.
Ver más →College Application Mistakes and the Design of Information Policies at Scale
Anaïs Fabre, Tomás Larroucau, Christopher A. Neilson, Ignacio Ríos · Journal of Political Economy (conditionally accepted)
In Chile's college admissions, close to 40% of applicants left their most preferred program off their list. Real-time, personalized admission chances and warnings raised assignment for unmatched students by 44%, and Chile scaled the policy nationwide.
Ver más →Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms
Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani, Christopher A. Neilson · Journal of Political Economy, 2024
When Chile's centralized college admissions platform grew from 25 to 33 universities, available seats rose about 40%. Students on the platform started college sooner, dropped out less and graduated more, with welfare gains of about US$650 per exam taker.
Ver más →Search and Biased Beliefs in Education Markets
Patrick Agte, Claudia Allende, Adam Kapor, Christopher A. Neilson, Fernando Ochoa · Working paper (R&R, Econometrica)
In Chile, families knew fewer than 20% of nearby schools well and overrated their first choice. Applicants listed three schools despite 13 with open seats within 2 km. Fixing misperceptions delivers 60% of the gains of full information.
Ver más →Centralized School Choice with Unequal Outside Options
Mohammad Akbarpour, Winnie van Dijk, Adam Kapor, Christopher A. Neilson, Seth Zimmerman · Journal of Public Economics, 2022
Systems that reward strategic ranking favor families with a backup option. Under New Haven's Boston mechanism, those who could stay put were 18.5 points likelier to rank a top-third school first. The gap shrank after the 2019 switch to Deferred Acceptance.
Ver más →Approximating the Equilibrium Effects of Informed School Choice
Claudia Allende, Francisco A. Gallego, Christopher A. Neilson · Working paper (R&R, Review of Economic Studies)
In a Chile trial with 1,832 preschool families, a video and personalized report card moved parents toward stronger schools; five years on, children of not-yet-enrolled families scored 0.22 SD higher in math. At scale, limited seats halve the effect.
Ver más →Parents' Earnings and the Returns to Universal Pre-Kindergarten
John Eric Humphries, Christopher A. Neilson, Xiaoyang Ye, Seth Zimmerman · Working paper (R&R, Econometrica)
New Haven's pre-K lotteries show universal pre-K raised parent earnings by 21.7% during the pre-K years, with gains lasting six-plus years. Taxes on those earnings cut net cost to government by 90%; each public dollar returned $10.04 in benefits.
Ver más →Can Information on School Attributes and Placement Probabilities Direct Search and Choice? Evidence from Choice Platforms in Ecuador and Peru
Felipe Arteaga, Gregory Elacqua, Thomas Krussig, Carolina Méndez, Christopher A. Neilson · IDB Working Paper, 2022
Trials in Tacna, Peru and Manta, Ecuador tested placement-risk feedback. Effects were stronger in Peru, helped by an extra WhatsApp warning and families' experience with competitive admissions. In Ecuador, 20% of high-risk applicants were badly overconfident.
Ver más →Quantifying the Benefits of Digitalizing and Centralizing Student Applications and Assignment to Schools
Antonia Aguilera, Gregory Elacqua, Josefina Lavin, Juan Margitic, Christopher A. Neilson · IDB Technical Note, 2022
Chile moved to a single digital school admission system from 2016 to 2019. This IDB analysis estimates a net impact of USD 13 million after costs, as families apply online outside working hours and the state stops monitoring school by school.
Ver más →
¿Quieres colaborar en investigación o acceder a nuestros datos y publicaciones? Escríbenos y te conectamos con el equipo.
Conversemos
Ya seas un gobierno local, una comunidad educativa o una familia explorando opciones escolares, estamos aquí para apoyarte. Escríbenos para descubrir cómo podemos colaborar para mejorar el acceso, la elección y la equidad en educación.